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1. Introduction 
 
 Two hundred and fifty million Africans (about 45% of the population) are poor. In 
rural areas, where most Africans live, there is, alas, a 'poor majority'. Rural poverty rates 
range from 37% in Madagascar and 41% in Kenya to 88% in Zambia and 94% in Ghana 
(Table 1). 
 It is hard to imagine an issue in development economics that is of greater 
importance to humankind than the effects of economic growth on poverty and economic 
well-being. Yet there is remarkably little consensus on this vitally important issue, as 
illustrated by the following two polar positions: 
 
 New patterns of growth will need to be developed and sustained well into the 
 21st century - to prevent ever more extreme imbalances and inequalities in the 
 world economy. (United Nations, 1996, p. 8) 
 
 In the extreme, the inequality of income may worsen fast enough at the outset of 
 economic growth for poverty to increase; growth would be 'immiserizing' . . . . 
 There is no case in which the effect of growth is offset by changes in inequality 
 (contrary to the immiserizing growth hypothesis.) In short, growth reduces 
 poverty. [Emphasis added.] (World Bank, 1990, pp. 46-7) 
 
This paper provides a fresh look at these issues with particular reference to Africa. In so 
doing, the methodologies for analyzing changing income distribution in the course of 
economic growth are introduced. Data and methods are analyzed in much greater depth 
in Fields (2000), to which the interested reader is referred. 
 It has been my experience that a great many people are deeply concerned about 
the distributional effects of economic growth, but some have not given careful thought to 
the precise nature of these concerns. Regardless of which category you find yourself in, 
you may find the following examples revealing (Fields, 1980). 
 Consider, first, two hypothetical countries A and B which initially are identical. 
After a period of time, national income data reveal that country A grew by 9% (in real 
terms, adjusting for inflation) while country B grew by 18%. In the absence of 
distributional data, you might simply suppose that because country B grew faster than 
country A, the people in country B came to be better off faster than those in country A. 
This, however, assumes the answer to the question of whether the material standards 
of living of a country's people are improved by economic growth - it does not show it. So 
suppose that we collect data and find that the income share of the poorest 40% of the 
countries' income recipients was 0.363 in both countries, but that these shares fell to 
0.333 in country A and to 0.307 in country B. Suppose too that we calculate a 
commonly used measure of income inequality, the Gini coefficient, and find that it rose 
from 0.082 to 0.133 in country A and from 0.082 to 0.162 in country B.2 Thus, in this 
example, there are two key facts: 
1) Both economies grew, but country B grew faster than country A. 
2) Income inequality increased in both economies, but it increased by more in 
country B than in country A. 
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At this point, I invite you to decide whether in your view economic development has 
taken place by asking yourself: Which do I prefer: the initial situation, the situation of 
country A or the situation of country B? 
 Consider now a second example. Two hypothetical countries, C and 
D, initially start out with 10% of their people working in relatively high-wage jobs (paying 
a real wage of $2 to each worker) and with 90% of their people working in relatively low-
wage jobs (paying a real wage of $1 to each)." After a certain period of time, we 
observe that 20% of the workers in country C are in $2 jobs and 80% in $1 jobs, while in 
country D, 30% are in the $2 jobs and 70% in the $1 jobs. Ask yourself again: Which do 
I prefer: the initial situation, the situation of country C or the situation of country D? 
 Let us take one final example. In two hypothetical economies E and F, the 
poorest 40% of the people initially receive an average income of $40 each. We observe 
them later and find that the average income of the poorest 40% has remained at $40 in 
both. There is no point in asking which is preferable, E or F, because no progress 
appears to have been made. 
 We come now to the punchline: all three examples come from the same 
underlying data. The initial situations were the same in all three examples; countries A, 
C and E are the same country, and countries B, D and F are the same country. Their 
respective income distributions are:  
The growth figures are obtained by noting that the total income goes from $11 initially to 
$12 in A-C-E (a 9% increase) to $13 in B-D-F (an 18% increase). The income share of 
the poorest 40% is 4/11 = 0.363 initially, 4 /12 = 0.333 in A-C-E and 4/13 = 0.307 in B-
D-F. The percentages in high- and low-wage jobs are apparent. The average incomes 
of the poorest 40% in the third example are calculated assuming that $1 is an hourly 
wage and that each worker works a 40 h week. 
 I would now ask you to consider one last time which you prefer: the initial 
situation, the situation of country A-C-E or the situation of country B-D-F? Did your 
answer change depending on how the data were presented? 
 I have used these examples and asked these questions to literally thousands of 
students and colleagues throughout the world and have found very few who gave the 
same answer in all three situations. This shows that one's view about economic growth - 
going so far as to question whether economic development takes place or not - 
depends on what one calculates. 
 These examples illustrate the three major approaches to income distribution 
analysis. The first is the relative inequality approach: the income share of the poorest 
40% and the Gini coefficient measure how inequality in the distribution of income 
changes. The second example illustrates the absolute income approach: how many 
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people receive how much income (in real terms). A special case of the absolute income 
approach is the absolute poverty approach, in which a poverty line is drawn (at $1.50, 
say) and a poverty measure is calculated (e.g., the percentage of people with incomes 
below the poverty line). The third example illustrates the relative poverty approach, 
because a group that is relatively the poorest (the poorest 40% in this case) is defined 
and their average incomes calculated. 
 These different ways of measuring changes in income distribution give quite 
different answers not only in the examples presented above but also in real-life data. 
This is because they actually are measuring quite different underlying phenomena. In 
much the same way that the raw data for any random variable can be processed to give 
information on distinct aspects of the distribution - location (mean, median, mode), 
dispersion (minimum, maximum, range, variance), skewness, kurtosis, etc. - the raw 
data on incomes can be processed to inform us about different aspects of the income 
distribution: mean growth, relative inequality, absolute poverty and the like. In the 
preceding examples, these different aspects of the income distribution change in 
different ways - the mean increases, inequality increases (at least, according to the 
measures presented), and poverty decreases. In actual countries' experiences as well, 
we find not only that these different measures can change in different directions but that 
in fact they do disagree about as often as not. 
 Three questions are taken up in what follows: 
 
1) How has inequality changed? 
2) How has poverty changed? 
3) How has economic well-being changed? 
4)  
The answers to these questions require that the analyst decide how to measure 
inequality, poverty and economic well-being, and then make the necessary calculations 
from the available data. The rest of this paper is organized accordingly. 
 Section 2 deals with inequality, Section 3 with poverty and Section 4 with social 
welfare comparisons. The lessons are summed up in Section 5. 
 
2. Inequality 
 
 One of the leading figures in the development economics field is the late Simon 
Kuznets, who won a Nobel Prize for his work on modern economic growth. Kuznets was 
also a president of the American Economic Association, and he used the occasion of 
his presidential address in 1954 (published as Kuznets, 1955) to set the stage for 
decades of research still very much ongoing today. In that address, he asked how 
income inequality tends to change in the course of countries' economic growth and 
formulated the famous hypothesis that inequality tends to increase in the early stages of 
economic growth, stabilize for a time, then decrease in the later stages, producing what 
has come to be called the 'inverted-U curve' or the 'Kuznets curve' in his honour. 
 Kuznets's work had two important methodological influences. First, because he 
focused his analysis of income distribution on inequality as opposed to poverty, many 
development economists followed his lead, and it was not until 20 years after his 
original work that poverty moved to centre stage in the development economics field. 
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Second, Kuznets's measurement of inequality was on the basis of particular inequality 
measures - in his case, the income shares of particular percentile groups in the 
population - as opposed to more robust Lorenz curve comparisons. 
 Lorenz curves for Nigeria in 1986 and 1993 are shown in Figure 1. Each curve 
plots the cumulative percentage of income received by the poorest p% of the 
population, ordered from lowest income to highest, as a function of p. If the income 
distribution were perfectly equal, the Lorenz curve would lie along the 45° line. At the 
other extreme, if the income distribution were perfectly unequal, the Lorenz curve would 
lie along the bottom and right-vertical axes. We can use the following criterion to make 
inequality comparisons for two income distributions: if one income distribution lies 
everywhere closer to the 45° line than another (except at the corners), then the first 
distribution is said to Lorenz-dominate the second, and for that reason, to be more 
equal. This occurs  in  Figure  1, from  which  we  can  infer  that  Nigeria's  income 
distribution became more unequal between 1986 and 1993.  
 It is possible that neither Lorenz curve dominates the other; in fact, it often 
happens that two Lorenz curves cross. In such cases, the Lorenz criterion cannot be 
used to rank the distributions' respective inequalities. If inequality comparisons are to be 
made, they must be done using an inequality measure (also termed a 'numerical 
inequality measure' or an 'inequality index'). Examples of inequality measures are the 
income share of the richest m%, the income share of the poorest n%, the Gini 
coefficient, Theil's two measures, Atkinson's index and the coefficient of variation. 
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Lorenz curves and inequality measures have been used in studies of quite a number of 
African countries. Africa has been shown to be a high-inequality region, second only to 
Latin America (Table 2). 
 African countries have been included in virtually all of the tabulations and 
regressions of the growth-inequality relationship ranging from the early multi-country 
studies of Adelman and Morris (1973), Paukert (1973) and Ahluwalia (1974, 1976) 
through to the very recent works of Deininger and Squire (1996a,b), Fishlow (1996) and 
Ali (1997). At first, these cross-country studies were viewed in causal terms. One of the 
most famous papers on the Kuznets curve (Ahluwalia, 1976, 
p. 307) led off as follows:  
 
 The use of cross country data for the analysis of what are essentially dynamic 
 processes raises a number of familiar problems. Ideally, such processes should 
 be examined in an explicitly historical context for particular countries. 
 Unfortunately, time series data on the distribution of income, over any substantial 
 period, are simply not available for most developing countries. For the present, 
 therefore, empirical investigation in this field must perforce draw heavily on cross 
 country experience. 
 
Later cross-sectional work abandoned any pretense of causality and viewed the cross-
country regressions in a purely correlative sense. In this later literature, the question 
quite simply is whether middle-income countries have higher inequality than lower-
income or higher-income countries do, with no causality implied. 
 Most of the literature has estimated the cross-country Kuznets curve using 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation, and has  typically found higher inequality in 
the middle-income countries than in either lower-income or higher-income countries (the 
exception is Anand and Kanbur, 1993). As it happens, though, nearly all the high-
inequality countries that have been included in such estimations are Latin American 
(Fields and Jakubson, 1994), and these countries have their own peculiar histories. This 
means that it is not being middle-income per se that produces high inequality but, 
rather, the fact that Latin 
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American countries have highly unequal distributions of land, wealth and other assets 
compared with other developing countries. Consequently, when Latin American 
dummies have been added to the cross-country regressions, these terms are found to 
have a significant positive association with inequality, eliminating the cross-country 
Kuznets curve (Deininger and Squire, 1996b; Fishlow, 1996). 
 Does a cross-country Kuznets curve exist for Africa? Chen et al. (1993) provided 
data on income inequality in African countries, 11 of which were included in the cross-
country work of Ali (1997). To see whether the Kuznets curve holds for African 
countries, I used two sets of data - the 11data points used by Ali and the full 16 reported 
by Chen et al. - and estimated two models. In the first, the Gini coefficient is regressed 
on mean expenditure (µ) and its square (µ2); in model 1, a positive coefficient on µ and 
a negative coefficient on µ2 would be consistent with the Kuznets inverted-U. In the 
second model, the Gini coefficient is regressed on µ and its inverse (1/µ); in model 2, for 
the Kuznets inverted-U to hold, the coefficients on both µ and l/µ must be negative. 
 The findings are reported in Table 3. Nothing is statistically significant. This is 
because the data are a random scatter, as can be seen in Figure 2. From this, I 
conclude that the Kuznets curve is simply not there for Africa, at least in these data. 
 Another strand of the literature has challenged the traditional cross-sectional 
methodology, taking advantage of the fact that some of the newer data sets offer 
multiple years of data for individual countries. The Fields-Jakubson data set includes 
Gini coefficients for 35 developing countries; for some of them, there are only single 
observations, but for others, there are many as 9 years of data. The Deininger-Squire 
data set incorporated these data and added to them, resulting in a sample of 108 
countries (both developing and developed), of which 32 offer eight or more 
observations. Such data enable a family of parallel curves to be fit with fixed effects 
estimation, allowing for some countries such as Zimbabwe to be on higher-than- 
average curves and others like Ethiopia to be on lower-than average curves. The 
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'central' curve - that is, the curve that would be predicted for an 'average' country - also 
comes out of such fixed effects estimation.  
 When this was done, both Fields and Jakubson (1994) and Deininger and Squire 
(1996b) found that the shape of the central Kuznets curve flips from a statistically 
significant inverted-U estimated by OLS to a statistically significant U with fixed effects 
estimation. Figure 3 shows this reversal in the Fields-Jakubson data. What this means 
is that if we want countries' inequality levels to change in the way that 'typical' countries' 
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inequality in fact changed over time, the U pattern fits the data better than does an 
inverted-U pattern or any other quadratic function. 
 However, once we have a data set containing so many countries with multiple 
years of data, it is no longer necessary to maintain that any particular pattern is 'typical'. 
Instead, we can look within countries to see how the inequality in each changes with 
economic growth. Deininger and Squire have done this using their data set and have 
got striking findings: 
 
1. In five of their 48 countries (Brazil, Hungary, Mexico, the Philippines, and 
Trinidad and Tobago), the Gini coefficient followed an inverted-U shape. 
2. In four countries (Costa Rica, India, the USA and the UK), the Gini coefficient 
followed a U shape. 
3. In the remaining 80% of the countries (including just Cote d'Ivoire and Tunisia in 
Africa), there was no statistically significant association between the Gini 
coefficient and national income.  
 
These findings indicate that the growth process itself can produce varied inequality 
patterns. The key question to ask is why. 
 Several researchers have analyzed 'growth spells' - that is, periods from one 
household survey or census to another during which economic growth took place 
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(Ahluwalia, 1974; Fields, 1991; Deininger and Squire, 1996b; Ravallion and Chen, 
1997). Based on Kuznets's work, it might have been thought that whether inequality 
increased or decreased during these growth spells would have been related to the 
country's stage of economic development and to its rate of economic growth. But in 
these studies, no such effect was found. In half of these growth spells, inequality 
increased, and in the other half, inequality decreased. Furthermore, no pattern was 
discerned - that is, whether inequality increased or decreased was unrelated either to 
the rate of economic growth or to whether the country was at a relatively early stage of 
economic development or a relative late stage. From this, we reach the conclusion that 
it is not the rate of economic growth or the stage of economic growth that determines 
whether income inequality increases or decreases, but rather what matters is the kind of 
economic growth. 
 Unfortunately, at the present time, our ability to measure changing inequality in 
African countries and to relate it to the type of economic growth in individual countries is 
severely limited by lack of data. The Chen et al. (1993) data set includes inequality 
figures on 14 African countries collected from the mid-1980s to the early 1990s, while 
the Deininger and Square data set includes 24 Sub-Saharan African countries and four 
North African ones. However, even in the Deininger-Squire data, which is the most 
recent and comprehensive, changes in quintile income or expenditure shares over time 
are available for only six African countries, often for periods no longer than 3 years.7 
These data, reproduced in Table 4, show three countries in which income grew and 
three in which it grew very little or not at all. In those with growth, inequality fell in two 
(Ghana and Mauritius) and rose in one (Morocco). In the three countries that did not 
grow, inequality rose in two (Nigeria and Uganda) and fell in one (Cote d'Ivoire). Thus 
far, then, we find no pronounced tendency for inequality to change any differently in the 
growing countries of Africa than in the non-growing ones. 
 Such data can and should be analyzed more deeply, and added to as more 
survey results become available. Here is where one research frontier lies. 
 
3. Poverty 
 
 'Poverty' has been defined as the inability of an individual or a family to command 
sufficient resources to satisfy basic needs. These basic needs include food, clothing, 
shelter, health care and the other necessities of life. 
 In the absolute poverty approach, these requirements are costed out and 
measured as a fixed number of units of a country's currency. The relevant unit (family or 
individual) is then classified as poor if its consumption (or income, if that is the chosen 
measure of economic well-being) is below the cut-off amount and non-poor if it is above 
that amount. This cut-off amount is called the 'poverty line' and will be denoted below by 
z. 
 Over time, the poverty line needs to be adjusted for changes in the cost of 
acquiring the basket of basic needs. When the poverty line is adjusted for inflation and 
only for inflation, z is said to define 'absolute poverty'. 
 Three groups of absolute poverty measures are used: 
 
(i) The Poverty Headcount and Headcount Ratio 
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 The poverty headcount (ℋ) is defined as the number of people in a population 
who are poor, while the poverty headcount ratio (𝐻) is the fraction who are poor: 
 
ℋ = 𝑞 
 
and 
 
𝐻 = 𝑞/𝑛. 
 
Because these are the simplest poverty measures and national statistical offices 
regularly publish such data, empirical researchers rely more on these than on any other 
poverty measures. 
 ℋ and 𝐻 have certain important limitations. Because they are concerned only 
with the number of people with incomes below the poverty line but not with their 
incomes, neither satisfies two properties that have been found desirable for poverty 
measurement. One is 'strong monotonicity', which is the idea that an increase in some 
poor person's income, holding the other poor persons' incomes constant, necessarily 
reduces poverty. ℋ and 𝐻 violate strong monotonicity, because if a poor person 
receives an income gain but remains poor, these measures show no fall in poverty. 
 The other property which many analysts find desirable for poverty measures is 
'distributional sensitivity', which is the idea that if, holding all other incomes the same, a 
poor person transfers an arbitrary sum of money to a richer person, then poverty  
increases. But when such a transfer is made, ℋ and 𝐻 stay the same (if the recipient 
remains poor) or decrease (if the recipient escapes poverty). 
 It follows that if you find strong monotonicity and distributional sensitivity 
appealing, you should not use. ℋ and 𝐻 unless you have no choice about it (which may 
well be the case if you are forced to rely on published data). If you do have the choice, 
you might prefer the following classes of measures instead, both of which have been 
used in work on Africa. 
 
(ii) The Sen Index of Poverty 
 
Sen (1976) suggested the following index of poverty. Let 𝑦
𝑝
 be the average income of 
the poor, 
 
𝐼  =  (𝑧 −  𝑦
𝑝
) 𝑧 
 
be the average (normalised) income shortfall among the poor and 𝐺𝑝 be the Gini 
coefficient of income inequality among the poor. The Sen poverty index, 𝑃𝑆𝑒𝑛 is defined 
as 
 
 𝑃𝑆𝑒𝑛 =   H[𝐼 + (1 − 𝐼)𝐺𝑝]. 
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It can readily be verified that the Sen index satisfies both strong monotonicity and 
distributional sensitivity. 
 
(iii) The 𝑃𝛼 Class 
 
This class of measures was devised by Foster et al. (1984). It is most easily understood 
by considering the ith individual's percentage income shortfall 
 
𝐼𝑖  =  (𝑧 − 𝑦𝑖)/𝑧. 
 
Consider a poverty measure which weights each individual's percentage income 
shortfall by itself. Thus, the income of an individual whose income is 10% below the 
poverty line is weighted by 10%, the income of an individual whose income is 50% 
below the poverty line is weighted by 50%, and so on. (For individuals with incomes at 
or above the poverty line, the shortfall is zero and the weight is zero as well.) Average 
these squared percentage shortfalls over the entire population. The resultant poverty 
measure is 
 
𝑃2 =  
1
𝑛
∑[(𝑧 −  𝑦𝑖)/𝑧]
2
𝑞
𝑖=1
 
 
The 𝑃𝛼 class generalizes this measure by replacing the exponent 2 by whatever 
exponent the researcher cares to specify: 
 
𝑃𝛼 =  
1
𝑛
∑[(𝑧 −  𝑦𝑖)/𝑧]
𝛼
𝑞
𝑖=1
 
 
Besides the 𝑃2 measure, other members of the 𝑃𝛼 class have intuitive meaning as well. 
For 𝛼 = 1, we have  
 
𝑃1 =  
1
𝑛
 ∑[(𝑧 −
𝑞
𝑖=1
 𝑦𝑖)/𝑧] =
𝑞
𝑛
1
𝑞
2
𝑛
∑[(𝑧 −
𝑞
𝑖=1
𝑦𝑖)/𝑧] =  𝐻𝐼  
 
that is, 𝑃1 is the 'per-capita income gap' or the 'normalised poverty deficit'. And for 𝛼 = 0, 
we have 
𝑃0 =  
𝑞
𝑛
= 𝐻,  
 
the poverty headcount ratio. We see too that as we progress from 𝑃0 to 𝑃1 to 𝑃2, the 𝑃𝛼 
measure gets more and more sensitive to extremely low incomes. 
 The three classes of poverty measures just presented are all absolute poverty 
measures, based on a fixed real poverty line, 𝑧. Some authors (e.g., Ali, 1997; Ali and 
Thorbecke, 1998; Ruggles, 1990) take exception to these measures, preferring to 
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measure relative poverty instead. Actually, 'relative poverty' embodies two separate 
ideas, and the relative poverty measures therefore fall into two categories. 
 In the first type of relative poverty measure, a group that is relatively the poorest 
(e.g., the poorest 40%) is defined, and the poverty measure used is then taken to be the 
average real income of this poorest group. Consider the example in Section I, in which 
the income distribution changes from 
 
to 
 
 
to 
 
 
The average absolute income of the poorest 40% of the population shows no change in 
this process. If you agree that poverty is unchanged in this process, then this type of 
relative poverty measure might be a reasonable one for you. But if you judge that 
poverty has fallen, then you are assuredly not a relative poverty adherent, at least in this 
first sense. 
 There is, however, a second sense in which you might wish to move in the 
direction of relative poverty, and that is to use a higher poverty line the richer the 
country in which poverty is being measured. Ravallion et al. (1991) have found 
empirically that the poverty lines used in countries tend to increase with their per capita 
consumption levels, and Ali  (1997) regards the desirability of raising the poverty line as 
the mean increases as 'obvious to us, Africans living amidst poverty'. While there are 
different ways of adjusting your poverty line 𝑧 as a function of the mean income or 
consumption, µ, the easiest such adjustment is to raise 𝑧 in proportion to increases in µ, 
producing a thoroughgoing relative poverty measure. This procedure applies either 
when 𝑧 has been set 'scientifically' to begin with (e.g., as the cost of purchasing the 
minimal basket of goods and services) or when 𝑧 has been set relatively from the 
beginning [e.g., at two-thirds of the median income, as is done by the Luxembourg 
Income Study (Atkinson et al., 1995), or at two-thirds of the mean, as is done by the 
World Bank (1995b)]. 
 Now let us examine what happens to poverty measures when the poverty line z 
increases proportionately with the meanµ. We may start with a given income distribution 
𝑋 and then increase everybody's real income by the same proportion, producing the 
new income distribution 𝜆𝑋, 𝜆 > 1. When z increases with µ, the number with incomes 
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below the poverty line is unchanged. So too are the average (normalized) income 
shortfall of the poor 𝐼 and the Gini coefficient of income inequality among the poor. This 
means that the poverty headcount (ℋ), the poverty headcount ration (𝐻), the Sen index 
of poverty (𝑃𝑠𝑒𝑛) and the 𝑃𝛼 and the Pa class will all show no change in poverty when 
such a relative poverty measure is applied to a situation in which everyone's real 
income increases by the same  percentage. If this is what you want, fine. But if you want 
poverty in a country to fall when everyone experiences a given percentage increase in 
income, then these relative poverty measures are not for you. 
 An alternative is to choose an absolute poverty line, relatively defined. That is, 
you can set your z higher in relatively rich countries like South Africa than in relatively 
poor ones likes Ethiopia, but having set a higher  than , you might then adjust these 
countries' poverty lines by their respective rates of inflation and nothing more. The best 
problem that any African country could have would be for its economy to grow so fast 
for so long that its current poverty line is rendered obsolete! 
 Turning now to empirical applications of these methods to Africa, as already 
noted, 250 million Africans are poor, and in rural Africa there is a poor majority. Poverty 
profiles have been compiled for many African countries. These include: 
 
1. Studies done in the countries: Ghana (Boateng et al., 1992), Ethiopia (Dercon 
and Krishnan, 1995; Dercon and Taddesse, 1996), Zambia (Alwang et al., 1996), 
Mauritania (Coulombe and McKay, 1996), Tanzania (Wangwe, 1996), South 
Africa (Bharat et al., 1995) and Kenya (Mukui, 1994; Kabubo and Kiriti, 1997). 
2. Multi-country studies done by outside researchers (Lachaud, 1994; Sahn, 1996; 
World Bank, 1996d; Ali and Thorbecke, 1997; Hanmer et al., 1997). 
3. Poverty assessments of individual countries done by the World Bank for Ghana, 
Ethiopia, the Gambia, Uganda, Zambia, Benin, Mauritania, Cape Verde, 
Cameroon, Ghana, South Africa, Nigeria and Tanzania (World Bank, 1996c,d,e). 
 
A review of poverty profiles (Lipton and Ravallion, 1995) reveals that the poor of the 
developing world are more likely to be characterized by: 
 
 larger household size 
 women 
 elderly 
 reliance on labor incomes 
 low caloric intakes 
 income variability 
 rural 
 
In turn, poverty in Africa is caused by (World Bank, 1996c, 1996d): 
 
 inadequate access to employment opportunities 
 inadequate physical assets, such as land and capital, and minimal access by the 
poor to credit even on a small scale 
 inadequate access to the means of supporting rural development in poor regions 
 inadequate access to markets where the poor can sell goods and services 
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 low endowment of human capital 
 destruction of natural resources leading to environmental degradation and 
reduced productivity 
 inadequate access to assistance for those living at the margin and those 
victimized by transitory poverty 
 lack of participation: failure to draw the poor into the design of development 
programs 
  
How does poverty relate to economic growth? Early studies claimed that economic 
growth either did not help the poor or actually made them poorer. Particularly influential 
was the work of Adelman and Morris (1973), who wrote (pp. 189 and 192): 
 
 Development is accompanied by an absolute as well as a relative decline in the 
 average income of the very poor. Indeed, an initial spurt of dualistic growth may 
 cause such a decline for as much as 60 percent of the population . . . . The 
 frightening implication of the present work is that hundreds of millions of 
 desperately poor people throughout the world have been hurt rather than helped 
 by economic development. 
 
This conclusion, if true, would be a damning indictment of economic growth. 
Fortunately, Adelman and Morris's own regression evidence offers no support for it 
(Adelman and Morris, 1973, pp. 222-3). Likewise, all subsequent studies which used 
this cross-section regression methodology also found that the richer the country, the 
higher the average absolute income of the poor. An important example is the influential 
paper by Ahluwalia (1976), based on a cross-section of 62 countries, both developed 
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and developing. He showed that the incomes of the poor increase monotonically as per 
capita national income rises.  
 The most direct test of the poverty-national income relationship in the cross-
section is to be found in the work of Ravallion (1995). Using an internationally 
comparable poverty line of $1 of consumption per capita per day in 1985 purchasing 
power parity (PPP) dollars, he calculated the poverty headcount index for each of 36 
developing countries, which he related to mean per capita consumption in the country, 
measured in the same units. The results, depicted in Figure 4, reveal a pronounced 
negative relationship between a country's income level and the extent of its poverty - a 
result confirmed by regression analysis (Lipton, 1996). 
 The evidence is unambiguous: the richer the country, the higher the absolute 
incomes of the poor and the lower the rate of poverty. The cross-sectional version of the 
absolute impoverishment hypothesis has been thoroughly discredited. 
 What about changes in poverty over time within countries? In the 1970s, data 
began to be available for individual countries, and these were drawn together by 
Ahluwalia et al. (1979) and Fields (1980). Ahluwalia et al. found, without exception, that 
the average real income of the poorest 60% rose over time in the 12 countries they 
examined. Fields, using country-specific poverty lines, found that absolute poverty fell in 
10 of the 13 countries covered and rose in three. Two of the three countries in which 
poverty did not fall are ones in which economic growth did not take place. The only 
country in which poverty rose in the course of economic growth was the Philippines 
under Marcos. The apparent political economy explanation ('crony capital- ism') is 
probably the right one. 
 Further multi-country studies were performed by Fields (1991), who analyzed 31 
spells; Chen et al. (1994) (18 spells); and Bruno et al. (1998) (20 spells). In most but not 
all cases, growth reduced poverty and recession increased it. For African countries in 
the latter half of the 1980s, we find that the economic growth of Morocco and Tunisia 
brought about a fall in the share of people below the poverty line level of consumption; 
during the economic stagnation in Ghana, poverty remained constant; and Cote 
d'Ivoire's recession led to an increase in poverty. 
 In the 1990s, studies have been done on poverty change in individual African 
nations, with the following results. When growth took place, poverty fell. This was the 
case in Ghana from 1987-8 to 1991-2 (Ghana Statistical Service, 1995; World Bank, 
1995a), in Nigeria from 1985 to 1992 (Canagarajah et al., 1995) and in rural Ethiopia 
from 1989 to 1994 (Dercon et al., 1994; Dercon and Krishnan, 1995). However, there 
were also negative results. In Kenya, lack of economic growth resulted in a constant 
poverty headcount ratio and continued poverty for an increasing number of people 
(Mukui, 1994; World Bank, 1996a). In Tanzania, real per capita income of the poorest 
40% fell by 28% between 1983 and 1991 (Ferreira, 1993; cited in Wangwe, 1996). And 
in Cote d'Ivoire, poverty increased during the 1985-8 recession, using the poverty 
headcount ratio, the normalized poverty deficit (𝑃1) and the squared poverty gap (𝑃2) for 
two alternative poverty lines (Grootaert, 1994). 
 The change in poverty can be attributed to two sources. First, there is economic 
growth: holding the dispersion of income the same, the faster the rate of economic 
growth, the larger the reduction in poverty. 
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 The second is changing dispersion: for any given growth rate, the more 
dispersive the distribution becomes, the smaller the reduction in poverty.9 
Ravallion and Datt (1992) set forth the following equation for dividing the poverty 
change in a country into a growth component, a redistribution component and a 
residual. Let poverty in a country at time t be denoted by 
 
𝑃𝑡 = 𝑃(𝑧/𝜇𝑡, 𝐷𝑡) 
 
where 𝑧 is the poverty line, 𝜇𝑡 is mean expenditure per capita and 𝐷𝑡  is the inequality in 
the distribution of expenditure per capita. Then the change in poverty between a base 
year B and a terminal year T can be written as 
 
Applying this methodology to African countries, Demery and Squire 
(1996) found that poverty change was largely determined by economic growth, and that 
changes in inequality were always of secondary importance; see Table 5. 
 The large effect of economic growth on poverty is confirmed by Bruno et al. 
(1998). For a sample of 20 countries between 1984 and 1993, they regressed the rate 
of change in the proportion of the population below $1 per day against the rate of 
change in the real value of the mean, and obtained a regression coefficient of -2.12, 
with a t ratio of -4.67. Thus, a 10% increase in the mean would produce roughly a 20% 
reduction in the proportion of people living on less than $1 a day. Large as this effect is, 
changing income inequality has an even larger effect: in a multiple regression, these 
authors found that the elasticity of the poverty headcount ratio with respect to the mean  
was -2.28, while the elasticity with respect to the Gini coefficient was 3.86. From 
this, they conclude (pp. 138, 140): 
 
 The point is not that distribution [i.e., inequality] is irrelevant or that it never 
 changes, but rather that its changes are generally uncorrelated with economic 
 growth. . . . The upshot of all that we know is that promoting economic growth is 
 good because it is a potentially, and, in most cases, an actually, important 
 vehicle for improving the living standards at all levels . . . 
 
It should be pointed out that in the preceding calculations, a constant real poverty line 
(z) was used. As noted, in a previous paper presented at this forum, Ali (1997) objected 
to this procedure, preferring instead to increase the poverty line as the mean increases. 
Doing this has the effect of lowering the magnitude of the reduction in poverty and also 
of reducing the contribution of growth to poverty reduction. As a consequence, Ali gets a 
much larger relative share of inequality change in poverty reduction than do Bruno et al 
In Ali's words: 
 
 If poverty reduction is adopted as an ''overarching objective' of development then 
 a policy which would result in a one percent reduction in the Gini coefficient 
 would lead to an equal percentage reduction in the headcount ratio, to twice the 
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 percentage reduction in the poverty-gap ratio and to three times the percentage 
 reduction in the squared poverty-gap ratio. On the other hand, a policy that leads 
 to a one percent increase in per capita income would be expected to lead to a 
 half a percentage reduction in all poverty measures. 
 
 
From this, Ali concludes that the 'obvious' policy implication is to adopt measures to 
reduce inequality and thereby enhance the poverty- reducing effects of growth. 
 Regardless of whether one adopts a fixed poverty line as in Ravallion and Datt 
and Bruno et al. or a variable poverty line as in Ali, an important qualifier needs to be 
added. In countries' actual experiences, it has proved far easier to generate economic 
growth than to change the Gini coefficient. In low-income countries, GNP per capita 
grew by 60% between 1980 and 1993 (World Development Report, 1995), while Gini 
coefficients in the world barely changed over the same period (Deininger and Squire, 
1996b, table 5). In a similar vein, Adelman and Robinson's simulation results for Korea 
showed that even huge changes in policy parameters (such as a doubling of the tax 
rate, increasing agricultural capital stocks by 30%, fixing all agricultural prices at world 
prices and subsidising the consumption of food, housing and medical services for the 
poorest 60% of households) would change the Gini coefficient by only one or two Gini 
points in most cases. The point is that in comparing the elasticities of poverty with 
respect to growth and with respect to inequality, one should not fall into the trap of 
thinking that it is as easy to lower inequality by 10% as it is to achieve 10% growth; the 
former is far more difficult than the latter. 
 
4. Economic Well-being 
 
So far in this paper, we have examined ways of determining whether one income 
distribution is more unequal than  another  and whether one income distribution has 
more poverty than another. Here, we ask a different question: When is one income 
distribution better than another? Here, 'better ' means that you would rather be born into 
one society than another or, if you were a social planner, you would choose one over 
the other. 
 Two types of approaches may be considered. The first combines the information 
on changes in inequality and poverty with information on GNP growth using what are 
called 'abbreviated social welfare functions'. The second is a kind of 'welfare dominance 
analysis'. 
 The term 'abbreviated social welfare function' was apparently introduced into the 
literature by Lambert (1989). A social welfare function is abbreviated if welfare is 
expressed as a function of statistics calculated from the income distribution vector, e.g., 
 
𝑊 = 𝑓(GNP, INEQ, POV) 
 
where GNP is a measure of income level such as gross national product (in real dollars 
per capita), INEQ is a measure of inequality and POV is a measure of poverty. When 
such functions are applied, it is usually with the stipulation that social welfare increases 
if GNP rises, INEQ falls or POV falls, and thus 
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𝑓1 > 0, 𝑓2 < 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑓3 < 0. 
 
 
Such a welfare function underlies the many empirical studies of Africa in which the 
inequality and poverty effects of economic growth have been measured. 
 The alternative is to apply what are called 'welfare dominance methods'. If 
microdata on individual incomes are used, one income distribution X is said to first-
order-dominate (equivalently, rank-order-dominate) a second distribution Y if the person 
who ranks poorest in each distribution has a higher income in X than in Y, and likewise 
for the second person, the third person and so on. Similarly, in aggregate data divided, 
say, into deciles, for one income distribution to first- order-dominate another, the income 
in the first decile of  X must be higher than in Y, the income in the second decile of X 
must be higher than in Y and so on. Note what makes this different from Pareto-
dominance: here, we are comparing the people who occupy particular positions in the 
income distribution regardless of their identities, whereas in testing for Pareto-
improvements, we need to compare the before and after incomes for named persons. 
 If first-order dominance does not hold, welfare rankings may still be possible, 
using what is called second-order dominance (also called generalized Lorenz curve 
dominance). The generalized Lorenz curve is defined as the ordinary Lorenz curve 
multiplied by the mean. Suppose that the generalized Lorenz curve for distribution X is 
somewhere above and never below that for distribution Y. According to theorems 
derived by Kolm (1976) and Shorrocks (1983), distribution X will be judged to be better 
than distribution Y for all social welfare functions which are anonymous, increasing in all 
incomes and S-concave.11 This tells us what is required to justify welfare comparisons 
using generalized Lorenz curves. But before using this criterion, you will have to think 
whether your social welfare function satisfies these three properties. 
 To the best of my knowledge, rank-dominance and generalized Lorenz-curve-
dominance studies have not yet been carried out for any African country (though they 
have been used in Latin American and Asian countries). This remains to be done in 
future work. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
 Poverty, inequality and economic well-being are different aspects of income 
distribution and must be treated distinctly. This paper has presented methods for 
measuring each and reviewed the available empirical evidence for Africa. The principal 
lessons that have been learned from the available, admittedly limited evidence are: 
 
 There is no Kuznets curve for African countries. Inequality has not tended to 
either increase or decrease in African economic growth. 
 When economic growth has taken place in Africa, poverty has fallen. When 
poverty has not fallen, it is because economic growth has not taken place. 
 Methods exist for measuring changes in social welfare and economic well-being, 
but these have not yet been applied in any African country. 
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It has not been the purpose of this paper to propose pro-poor development policies; 
other papers prepared in this series do that. I shall conclude merely by mentioning 
some key issues and some specific references for further reading on each: 
 
 Overall development policy (Berthelemy, 1995; Ndulu and van de Walle, 1996; 
World Bank, 1996b; Wolgin, 1997) 
 Structural adjustment policies (Cornia et al., 1987; Bourguignon et al., 1991; 
Jamal and Weeks, 1993; Thorbecke and Kone, 1995; Demery and Squire, 1996; 
Sahn, 1996) 
 Labor-demanding growth (World Development Report, 1990, 1995; Turnham, 
1993; Horton et al., 1994; Jamal, 1995; ILO, 1997; Bigsten, 1997) 
 Investing in the human capital of the poor (Schultz, 1988; World Development 
Report, 1990; Strauss and Thomas, 1995; United Nations, 1996) 
 Agricultural development (Thorbecke and Morrisson, 1989; Timmer, 1991; 
Cleaver and Donovan, 1995; Tomich et al., 1995; Delgado, 1996; Platteau and 
Hayami, 1996) 
 Directed social spending (Ferroni and Kanbur, 1990; Anand and Ravallion, 1993; 
Grootaert, 1994; van de Walle and Nead, 1995; Demery et al ., 1995; Streeten, 
1995) 
 Targeted anti-poverty interventions (Besley  and  Kanbur,  1993; Lipton and 
Ravallion, 1995; World Bank, 1996b; Besley, 1997; van de Walle, 1997) 
 Reducing inter-group inequalities (Haddad, 1991; Barker, 1992; United Nations, 
1995; Anand and Sen, 1995; Mwabu and Schultz, 1996; Standing et al., 1996) 
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